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BAIL AND ITS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
THE POOR: A CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION AS A
VEHICLE OF REFORM
INTRODUCTION
The present money-based bail system's most "glaring weakness
is that it discriminates against poor defendants, thus running di-
rectly counter to the law's avowed purpose of treating all defendants
equally."' Under the present money-based bail system, the judge
sets the amount of bail according to a master bail schedule which
is based on the seriousness of the criminal charge and ignores any
consideration of the defendant's ability to pay.' Since the indigent
defendant cannot pay the bail or even a bondsman the standard ten
percent premium, he loses his pretrial liberty and languishes in jail
awaiting his trial.
The indigent's rights in our criminal process have been recog-
nized and safeguarded by a long series of cases. He is allowed an
attorney during interrogation; 3 he is provided an attorney during his
trial;4 and he is guaranteed equal treatment in the appeal process.'
Moreover he cannot be imprisoned because of his inability to pay a
fine. Yet despite this recognition and protection of the rights of
indigents in these areas of the criminal proceedings, the question
whether the present money-based bail system denies the indigent
equal protection remains unanswered by the United States Su-
preme Court.7
1. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 131 (1967).
2. The widespread use of schedules that are based on the charge rather than the defen-
dant's ability to pay is well established. ATrORNEY GENERAL COMMISSION ON POVERTY AND
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT 62 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Attorney General
Report]; D. FREED AND P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964 9-21 (1964); PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS 30 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report].
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 333 (1963) (felonies); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972) (misdemeanors).
5. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1962); Lane
v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 373 U.S. 487 (1963).
6. Short v. Tate, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
7. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971), did not answer this question. In that case the
petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the Illinois bail system which provided a method
for depositing ten percent of the bail amount with the court. On appearance at trial, the
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This question probably remains unheard and unanswered be-
cause the usual method of raising the issue in the criminal process
is difficult and presents certain shortcomings. Under the criminal
process approach, the indigent would have to rely on his already
overworked public defender who has difficulty having enough time
and resources to defend the indigent adequately on the charges
against him without raising the bail issue.' Furthermore, even if he
could get the issue introduced and decided by the court in his indi-
vidual case, the court might conclude that the bail was excessive in
his individual case but not attack the use of the scheduled bail
system in general.
An alternative approach could be bringing a class action in
federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 9 This civil rights approach has
distinct advantages over the criminal process approach. First, the
civil action provides a broader scope of discovery which would per-
mit the plaintiff to document the reliance by the courts on bail
schedules and to demonstrate in general the consequences of
pretrial detention on the trial (i.e., higher conviction rates and
harsher prison sentences for defendants detained prior to trial). Sec-
ond, since it can be brought as a class action, it insures a broader
impact and relief for all similarly situated indigents. Third, the civil
action approach allows the court to design equitable relief to require
the institution of a pretrial release system that does not discrimi-
nate against the poor.
This note will explore the possibility of bringing a § 1983 action
attacking the present money-based bail system. It will discuss the
possible procedural difficulties that such an action may present and
ways to avoid or overcome them. It will also explore the substantive
accused received ninety percent of this deposit back. The petitioner alleged that the retention
of the ten percent of the deposit (one percent of the actual amount of bail set) was a denial
of equal protection since a person who paid the full amount of the set bail to the court received
the entire amount back on appearance at the trial. The question presented in this note can
be distinguished from Schilb in at least two ways: (1) the petitioner in Schilb was not denied
his freedom prior to trial and thus did not languish in jail; (2) the petitioner did not allege
that he was indigent or that the ten percent method was used by the poor any more than by
the wealthier defendants. (The Court suggested that the ten percent provision may be more
attractive to the wealthy than the full amount method.)
8. See generally Katz, Gideon's Trumpet: Mournful and Muffled, 6 CRIM. L. BULL. 529
(1970).
9. Questions may be raised as to whether there is a proper or sufficiently defined class,
but these are typical issues in any class action and are thus not within the scope of this note.
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 6
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issues of what equal protection standard of review should be em-
ployed in such a case and whether the present bail system is consti-
tutional under that test.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
At least three procedural issues are presented by bringing a
§ 1983 action against the state bail system and its administration
by the county: (1) whether the writ of habeas corpus is the only
correct remedy available;'" (2) whether the federal court should
abstain because of comity considerations;" and (3) whether the
case is mooted if the defendant is tried or released before the
federal court hears the case. These procedural difficulties can be
surmounted by a precise delineation of the relief sought. The prayer
for relief should be confined to a request for (1) a declaratory judg-
ment that since the present bail system relies on money or cash
bonds it is unconstitutional, (2) equitable relief requiring the insti-
tution of a system which does not rely on money bail or cash bonds
and (3) damages against the county for collateral consequences (i.e.,
loss of job and hardship on the indigent's family). If the relief sought
is so defined, the possible procedural difficulties should not thwart
a civil action in federal court against the existing money-based bail
system.
Preiser v. Rodriguez'2 may at first glance appear to bar a § 1983
action against the bail system and limit the indigent to the remedy
of a writ of habeas corpus. In that case the Supreme Court held that
When a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or dura-
tion of his physical imprisonment and the relief he seeks is
a determination that he is entitled to immediate or more
speedy release from that imprisonment, his sole federal
remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.' 3
10. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). The plaintiffs in that case were state
prisoners who brought a § 1983 action alleging that they were deprived of good time credits
by the New York State Department of Correctional Services as a result of disciplinary
proceedings that were unconstitutional. They sought injunctive relief to compel restoration
of the credits, which in each case would result in their immediate release from prison.
11. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The defendant in a pending criminal trial
sought to enjoin the state court trial by bringing an action in the federal court. He alleged
that the statute he was being tried under was unconstitutional. The Court held that except
for very limited circumstances the federal courts should abstain from enjoining state criminal
trials because of comity and federalism considerations.
12. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
13. Id. at 500.
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The case of the indigent challenging the constitutionality of the
present bail system can be distinguished from the case of a prisoner
seeking immediate or more speedy release from prison in at least
two ways. First, the indigent is not seeking his guaranteed release
from pretrial detention; he is only seeking an opportunity for him-
self and other indigents to seek release under a fair system which
does not discriminate against the poor.'4 Thus, since the indigent is
not seeking his automatic release, a § 1983 action, rather than a writ
of habeas corpus, is the appropriate remedy.
Second, even if the prayer for relief is construed as requiring the
release of the plaintiff in such a case, the indigent is still not neces-
sarily prevented from using a § 1983 action by Preiser. The Supreme
Court stated that a § 1983 action is the proper remedy for a prisoner
who challenges the condition of his confinement rather than the fact
of his confinement.' 5 If those released on bail are still "in custody,"
then the plaintiff seeks only to modify the condition of his being in
custody and not the fact of being in custody. The term "in custody"
is not limited to mere physical restraint.'6 This concept of "in cus-
tody" has been expanded by the Court to include a person released
on bail or his own recognizance pending the appeal of his convic-
tion.'7 This idea of being "in custody" while one is released on bail
has also been employed during the pretrial period.'8 Thus, the indi-
gent is not challenging the fact of being in custody but rather the
condition (i.e., physical confinement) of his being in custody. Since
the Preiser decision allows a § 1983 action to challenge the condition
of his confinement, it would not necessarily frustrate the use of a
§ 1983 action in challenging the present money-based bail system.
The Younger v. Harris'9 decision and its conception of comity
14. The desired relief does not require that all accused persons, or even that all indi-
gents, be guaranteed automatic pretrial release. The state still could establish a system where
some defendants may be detained prior to trial if they are sufficiently poor risks.
15. 411 U.S. at 499.
16. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963). The petitioner sought to be released
from parole.
17. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
18. United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1973); Burris
v. Ryan, 397 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1968). Contra, Matysek v. United States, 339 F.2d 389 (9th
Cir. 1964).
19. 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82 (1971).
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss1/6
BAIL AND THE POOR
and federalism may also appear on the surface to be an obstacle to
the indigent's challenge in this situation. In Younger v. Harris and
the series of cases that followed, the Supreme Court held that fed-
eral courts will not interfere with pending state criminal prosecu-
tions unless irreparable injury is "both great and immediate""0 or
the state law is "flagrantly and patently violative of express consti-
tutional prohibitions"'" or there is a showing of "bad faith, harass-
ment or other unusual circumstances.1222
The indigent's attack on the bail system can be distinguished
from the Younger line of cases because the relief which the indigent
seeks is not the enjoining of a pending state criminal prosecution.
The indigent is not requesting that the prosecution against him be
enjoined, but only that he be given an opportunity to seek release
under a nondiscriminatory bail system. The Younger series of cases
dealt only with the proper policy to be followed in order "to inter-
vene by injunction or declaratory judgment in a state court. '2 1
Even if one could interpret the injunctive relief as interfering
with a criminal proceeding because it deals with the setting of bail,
challenging the constitutionality of the statute that one is being
tried under can be differentiated from challenging the constitution-
ality of a criminal proceeding which would not necessarily interfere
with the ultimate prosecution of the accused by the state. This
distinction was pointed out in Conover v. Montemuro4 where juve-
niles brought a § 1983 action to challenge the "intake" procedure
of the state juvenile court on the basis of due process and equal
protection violations. The court said that equitable relief sought did
not amount to "an injunction which will halt or substantially inter-
fere with a pending prosecution."2 Just as the juveniles in Conover
20. 401 U.S. at 46.
21. Id. at 53.
22. Id. at 54.
23. Id. at 57 (Stewart, J., concurring). This qualification has been emphasized in other
cases. E.g. Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1972); Thomas v. Hefferman, 473 F.2d
478 (2d Cir. 1973); Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1971); Anderson v. Nemetz, 474
F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973).
24. 477 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1973).
25. Id. at 1080. O'Shea v. Littleton, 94 S.Ct. 669 (1974), may appear to cast doubt on
this distinction. In that case, the plaintiffs brought a civil rights class action against a
magistrate and circuit judge, who allegedly engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of
racial discrimination in bail, sentencing and jury fees. The Court stated that comity consider-
19741
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were not attempting to halt the prosecution against them, the indi-
gent in the bail case is not seeking to halt or prevent the prosecution
against him.
Although Conover was a juvenile proceeding, the same ration-
ale is applicable to a criminal proceeding. The decision in Conover
did not turn on the fact that it was a juvenile proceeding; it was
based on the fact that policy and comity considerations are different
when a person attacks the constitutionality of the statute he is being
prosecuted under than when he attacks the constitutionality of a
criminal procedure that would not halt or interfere with the actual
prosecution. Where the constitutionality of the criminal statute that
one is being tried under is challenged, the state can narrow its
application so as not to declare the entire statute unconstitutional
and stifle the state prosecution against the defendant. In the
Younger v. Harris line of cases the Court was troubled that a federal
court ruling before the state is given an opportunity to narrow its
construction may bar the state from convicting the defendant., But
where a proceeding that would not directly affect the outcome of the
actual prosecution is attacked for its alleged unconstitutionality, a
decision by the federal court would not adversely affect the state's
legitimate interest in prosecuting the defendant because the state
could still prosecute the defendant. 7 Thus, the Younger v. Harris
ations prevented the granting of injunctive relief. This case, however, does not necessarily
preclude relief in the bail case for several reasons. (1) The decisive factor in that case was a
question of standing. Since the Court concluded that it failed to present a "case or contro-
versy," the Court's discussion of comity was merely dictum. (2) The subject matter of
Littleton was more sweeping and did involve areas which were closely connected with actual
prosecution (i.e., sentencing and jury selection). A federal court decision on these matters
would interfere more with the actual prosecution than a decision on bail setting. (The Court
did not separate the bail issue from the other issues in the case.) (3) The real comity consider-
ation in Littleton was not so much the actual decision of whether the practices were discrimi-
natory, but rather the real comity consideration was with the enforcement of that decision
in future cases. The Court feared that "an ongoing audit of state criminal proceedings" would
be required. Id. at 678. The district court in the bail case could design a narrower equitable
relief that would not require such a "periodic reporting system" to the federal courts. Id. at
679. (4) Even if injunctive relief would be precluded because of enforcement problems, the
federal court could still grant declaratory relief. Request for injunctive and declaratory relief
should not be treated as a single issue. Steffel v. Thompson, 94 S.Ct. 1204 (1974); Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
26. The Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris emphasized the overriding comity and
federalism considerations that the pronouncing of the statute one is being tried under as
unconstitutional might strip the state of the power to prosecute the individuals. 401 U.S. at
51.
27. 477 F.2d 1091 (Adams, J., concurring).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 6
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doctrine of comity and federalism should not apply in the case of
the indigent attacking the constitutionality of the present money-
based bail system.
Even after the Preiser v. Rodriguez and Younger v. Harris pro-
cedural hurdles are surmounted, another procedural hurdle may
exist. If the indigent is tried or released before his § 1983 action is
decided by the federal court, there may appear to be a mootness
problem. However, a closer analysis of the mootness doctrine sug-
gests at least three ways around the mootness question. First, a
cause of action is not rendered moot if it is "capable of repetition,
yet evading review." 2 This idea has been applied to other cases
concerning pretrial detention issues where the named plaintiff was
acquitted or convicted before his civil action was decided by the
federal court. 9 Similarly in Conover v. Montemuro, where the juve-
niles attacked the constitutionality of the "intake" proceedings, the
court held that the completion of the juvenile court proceeding
against the plaintiffs did not render the case moot.3 0 The policy
behind this doctrine is to prevent the setting "in motion such a
litigatious merry-go-round where . . . there is a short-lived contro-
versy of potentially recurring character."3' Thus, even if the indi-
gent who brings the § 1983 action challenging the bail system is
acquitted or convicted in the state court before the federal court
hears the bail issue, the case should not be treated as moot because
it is an action "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
Second, the litigant in the bail suit still may assert collateral
consequences which prevent the case from becoming moot.32 While
the plaintiff may no longer seek an opportunity to obtain his release
28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (abortion case); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 333 n.2 (1972) (residency requirements for voting); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816
(1969) (voting requirements); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 41, 52-53 (criminal conviction
challenged where defendant had already served the sentence).
29. In Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 514 (1973), the petitioner challenged the constitu-
tionality of the denial of the right to vote while the petitioner was in jail pending his trial.
30. 477 F.2d at 1081-82.
31. Indiana Employment Security Division v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540, 545 (1973) (Mar-
shall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). The majority remanded the case to the District Court of
Northern Indiana to answer the question of mootness.
32. Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 489, 495-500 (1969) (actual seating of congressman
no longer possible, but question of back salary remains); Carafas v. LaValle, 391 U.S. 234,
237-38 (1968) (prison sentence has expired, but consequences of his conviction survive); Liner
v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 304-09 (1964) (injunctive relief mooted, but liability remains).
1974]
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during the pretrial period by being considered for release on his own
recognizance under a fair system, he may have suffered damages
such as loss of his job and his family's loss of parental support and
care during his pretrial detention. Because he and his family experi-
enced these collateral consequences, the controversy remains alive.
Third, in a class action the controversy does not become moot
as to the other members of the class if the named plaintiff's case is
decided.3 There are still indigents who must suffer pretrial deten-
tion and languish in jail solely because they lack the scheduled bail
amount under the present bail system.
Therefore, although procedural issues do exist in bringing a
§ 1983 action against the existing bail system, these difficulties are
surmountable. First, the Preiser v. Rodriguez prohibition on the use
of a § 1983 action does not apply to such a case because the indigent
is not seeking his automatic release from custody. It also does not
apply because under a broad definition of "in custody" the indigent
only seeks to modify the condition of his confinement (i.e., physical
detention) and not the fact of being in custody. Second, the Younger
v. Harris concept of comity does not force the federal court to ab-
stain from the case because it is not enjoining or interfering with a
criminal prosecution. Third, the mootness problem does not exist
because it is an action "capable of repetition, yet evading review,"
it entails collateral consequences and it remains alive as to other
members of the class even if the named plaintiff is convicted or
acquitted by the state court before the federal court hears the bail
suit. Thus, despite these apparent procedural impediments, a
§ 1983 action appears to be a viable approach procedurally.
STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In determining whether a § 1983 action presents a viable sub-
stantive solution for the indigent who faces discrimination under the
33. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 4C F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Vaughn v. Bower, 313 F.
Supp. 37 (D. Ariz. 1970); Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The Supreme
Court in Indiana Employment Security Division v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540 (1973), remanded
the case to the District Court of Northern Indiana to see if the action was mooted when the
named plaintiff received the desired benefit. The Court indicated that an adequate represent-
ative must be substituted. See also, Note, Does Mooting of the Named Plaintiff Moot a Class
Suit Commenced Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 3 VAL. U.L.
REv. 333 (1974).
34. See note 28 supra.
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 6
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present bail system, the proper standard of review for the equal
protection question must be established. The Supreme Court has
developed at least two standards of review to determine whether a
law violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Under
the traditional rational basis or minimum test, different classifica-
tions are constitutional if they bear a rational relationship to a
permissible state interest. 5 Under the strict judicial scrutiny test,
different classifications are constitutional only if they are necessary
to promote a compelling state interest." This more rigid test is
applied to situations involving a suspect criterion37 and to situations
infringing upon fundamental rights.38 This stricter test should be
employed to judge the constitutionality of the present money-based
bail system because it involves a suspect classification and intrudes
on fundamental rights.3 9
When a scheduled bail system is used, the only criterion distin-
guishing those who gain pretrial freedom from those who remain
locked behind bars is the defendant's economic status. The Su-
preme Court has implied in several decisions that classifications
based on wealth should be treated as suspect as classifications based
on race or alienage. In Edwards v. California9 Justice Jackson sug-
35. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 383 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 361 (1911).
36. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
37. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1955) (race); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
(alienage); Oyaam v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Koresmastu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (national origin).
38. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968) (family relationship); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1964) (right to vote); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (right of association).
39. Some members of the Supreme Court have suggested that instead of two clear tests
there is a spectrum of different standards of review in equal protection cases. Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441, 459 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). They suggest that between
strict and minimum scrutiny are other variations in degree of scrutiny. Under this view even
if the court would find that wealth is not as "suspect" as racial classification or that the rights
infringed by pretrial detention are not as "fundamental" as the right to vote, one would not
be left with the mere rational basis test. See Gunther, Forward, In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAav. L. REv. 1, 12
(1972).
40. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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gested that "the mere state of being without funds is a neutral
fact-constitutionally an irrelevance like race, creed or color."4 The
Supreme Court in Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors2 ruled that
a state could not deny a citizen the right to vote because he was
unable to pay a poll tax. The Court stated that "lines drawn on the
basis of property like those of race are traditionally disfavored."43
The Court has alluded to this same idea of the suspect quality of
classifications based on wealth in the area of criminal procedure. In
Griffin v. Illinois" the Supreme Court pronounced that "in criminal
trials a state can no more discriminate on account of poverty than
on account of religion, race or color."45 In McDonald v. Board of
Election Commissioners" the Supreme Court noted that strict scru-
tiny "is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of
wealth or race, . . . two factors which would independently render
a classification highly suspect."47
Despite these indications by the Court that wealth is a suspect
classification, San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez" may on the surface appear to cast doubt on this view.
In that case, the Texas method of financing education was chal-
lenged as unconstitutional since the poorest property districts paid
a higher percentage of property tax but were unable to provide as
much money per student for education. The Supreme Court, em-
ploying the more lenient test, held that it was not a denial of equal
protection. This case, however, can be distinguished from the other
cases involving wealth classifications and specifically from the case
41. Id. at 184.
42. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
43. Id. at 668.
44. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
45. Id. at 17. See Short v. Tate, 401 U.S. 395 (1972); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 373 U.S. 477 (1963);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1962).
46. 394 U.S. 802 (1969). The Court denied the claim that the Illinois statute authorizing
voting by absentee ballot in only specified classes of cases denied equal protection because it
did not extend the absentee voting privilege to qualified voters who were in jail pending their
trials. The Court noted that the record failed to indicate whether the state might allow the
plaintiffs to vote by some other method.
47. Id. at 807. In Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973), the Court held that where
pretrial detainees were denied the right to vote by any means there was a substantial constitu-
tional question. The Court noted that strict scrutiny is required when "classifications were
drawn on the basis of suspect criteria, such as wealth or race." 409 U.S. at 520.
48. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
[Vol. 9
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss1/6
BAIL AND THE POOR
of the indigent under the present bail system in at least two ways.
First, the Court noted that the school financing case lacked a "defi-
nite description of the classifying facts or delineation of the disfa-
vored class."4 The Court stated that there was no reason to believe
that the poorest families were "necessarily clustered in the poorest
property districts." 0 The Court failed to find a direct correlation
between poor individuals and poor property districts. The indigent
class in the constitutional challenge of the present bail system how-
ever presents a clear delineation of a disfavored class since under a
scheduled bail system the economic status of the defendant is di-
rectly related to his opportunity to gain pretrial freedom. It corre-
sponds with the other cases where the Court has struck down classi-
fications based on wealth. Second, the Court distinguished the
school financing cases involving wealth classifications on the
grounds that the children were not absolutely deprived of an educa-
tion.' The indigent under the present bail system is, however, abso-
lutely denied his pretrial freedom. Furthermore, the Court implic-
itly suggested that wealth was a suspect classification by emphasiz-
ing the two distinctions between the school financing case and the
other cases involving indigents. 2 Thus the Court did not eliminate
wealth as a suspect classification.
Because classifications based on wealth share many similarities
with classifications based on race or alienage, strong policy consid-
erations dictate that wealth should be treated by the courts as a
suspect classification. First, strict judicial scrutiny for suspect clas-
sifications has been justified by the Court because of the need to
protect politically impotent minorities.53 In Hobsen v. Hansen,54 the
49. Id. at 19.
50. Id. at 23.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 20-22. The Court specifically distinguished the school financing case from
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1962), Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
53. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1125 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]. The Supreme Court in United States v. Carolene
Production Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), stated that "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities and which may
call for a correspondingly more searchingly judicial inquiry." Accord, Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 370 (1971).
54. 296 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
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District Court of the District of Columbia emphasized this policy
consideration in relation to poor or racial minorities:
The explanation for this additional scrutiny of practices,
which, although not directly discriminatory, nevertheless
fall harshly on such groups relates to the judicial attitude
toward legislative and administrative judgments. Judicial
deference to these judgments is predicated in the confid-
ence courts have that they are just resolutions of the con-
flicting interests. This confidence is often misplaced when
the vital interest of the poor and of racial minorities are
involved. For these groups are not always assured a full and
fair hearing through the ordinary political processes, not so
much because of the charge of outright bias; but because
of the abiding danger that the power structure-a term that
need carry no disparaging or abusive overtones-may inc-
line to pay little heed to even the deserving interests of a
politically voiceless and invisible minority. These consider-
ations impel a close judicial surveillance and review of
administrative judgments adversely affecting racial
minorities, and the poor, than otherwise would be neces-
sary .55
Since the poor are relatively powerless to protect themselves in the
political process, stronger judicial scrutiny is required in dealing
with classifications based on wealth." Second, strict judicial scru-
tiny for suspect classifications is warranted because they involve
unalterable traits "over which an individual has no control and for
which he should receive neither blame nor reward.""7 Since classifi-
cations based on such unalterable traits are generally unsuited to
the advancement of any proper governmental purpose, such classifi-
cations should be more strictly scrutinized." Because poverty, like
race or alienage, is beyond one's control, stricter judicial scrutiny is
compelled. Third, the strict scrutiny for suspect classifications is
55. Id. at 507-08. [emphasis added].
56. Michelman, Forward, On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment,
83 HAav. L. REV. 7, 20 (1970).
57. Developments, supra note 53, at 1127.
58. Michelman, supra note 56, at 21.
59. POVEaTY AMID PLENTY, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON INCOME MAIN-
TENANCE PROGRAMS 17 (1969):
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justified to prevent further stigmatizing of a class already burdened
with a badge of inferiority."0 Since the poor often bear a stigma of
inherent inferi6rity which resembles the stigma placed on other sus-
pect classifications, strict judicial scrutiny is needed.' Thus, con-
sidering the need to protect powerless minorities, the unalterability
of the trait coupled with its general unsuitedness to advance any
permissible governmental purpose and the difficulty of escaping a
stigma of inferiority, classifications based on wealth require strict
judicial scrutiny.
Not only does the treatment of the indigent under a money-
based bail system involve a suspect classification, but it also in-
fringes on the fundamental right to a fair trial and his right to pre-
trial freedom. Pretrial detention impedes the indigent in achieving
his "constitutional promise of a fair trial""2 in several ways. Pretrial
detention, for instance, handicaps the indigent because he is unable
to assist his attorney in locating needed witnesses. 3 This difficult
burden placed on the unassisted attorney to locate witnesses is even
greater when he must find the needed witnesses in ghetto areas.
Tracking down ordinary defense witnesses in the slums to
support the defendant's alibi or to act as character wit-
nesses often has a Runyanesque aspect to it. The defendant
in jail tells his counsel he has known the witnesses for years
but only by the name of "Toothpick," "Malachi Joe" and
"Jet." He does not know where they live or if they have a
phone, he is sure he could find them at the old haunts, but
his descriptive faculties leave something to be desired.
Since a subpoena cannot be issued for "Toothpick," of no
known address, counsel sets off on a painstaking, often frus-
For most of those currently poor changes in economic status are largely beyond their
control. Generally, they are doing what they can considering their age, health status,
social circumstances, location, education, and opportunities for employment. Pov-
erty is not a chosen way of life.
60. Developments, supra note 53, at 1127.
61. Michelman, supra note 56, at 21.
62. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956). Many of the pretrial detainees do not even
receive a trial because the defendant pleads guilty. Pines, An Answer to the Problems of Bail:
A Proposal in Need of Empirical Confirmation, 9 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoB. 396, 398 (1973):
In light of the personal losses caused by removal from society, the uncertain and often
long and brutal pretrial detention period, and the defendant's doubts of acquittal,
plea bargaining becomes a defendant's most realistic course. Despite actual inno-
cence, he confesses in order to begin serving a known, relatively light sentence in a
more human prison facility.
63. Attorney General Report, supra note 2, at 11.
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trating, search of the defendant's neighborhood. He stops
children at play; he attempts door-to-door conversations
with hostile and suspicious slum dwellers. 4
Furthermore, even if the defendant's attorney finds the needed wit-
nesses without the aid of the accused, he faces the difficult task of
inducing the witnesses to come forward at the trial without the help
of the defendant." The detained indigent is also hampered in con-
ferring with his attorney prior to the trial. The attorney must spend
additional time traveling to the client since his client cannot come
to his office, 6 must wait for visiting hours which are often inconven-
ient, 7 and is unable to make needed spot calls to check details." In
short, while the defendant is guaranteed the assistance of counsel,
"conditions in jail often make this guarantee meaningless." 9 The
defendant is also handicapped in conferring with his attorney dur-
ing the trial because he is under guard.70 The detained defendant,
moreover, suffers because the fact that he is in physical custody may
have a negative psychological impact on the jury.'
Studies have verified the impact that pretrial detention has on
64. P. Wald, Poverty and Criminal Justice in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (app. C) 139,
145 (1967). This problem of locating witnesses by an unaided attorney was also reported by
student directors of the Yale Law School Public Defender Association. They reported that it
was almost impossible for them to find the needed witnesses that "the accused could probably
find within a short time if permitted to search for them." Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice
Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 969-70 n.27 (1961).
65. Attorney General Report, supra note 2, at 71.
66. Foote, The Coming Constitution Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125, 1147 (1965).
67. P. Wald, Poverty and Criminal Justice in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (app. C) 139,
144 (1967).
68. Id.
69. Note, The Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79
YALE L.J. 941, 942 n.6 (1970).
70. P. Wald, Poverty and Criminal Justice in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (app. C) 139,
147 (1967):
A defendant under courtroom guard raises tactical as well as psychological problems.
During the trial his lawyer may need to consult with him privately in the courtroom,
but his guard is always in range. There can be no productive lunch or recess confer-
ences, no quick trips to locate last minute rebuttal witnesses, no pretrial warm-ups
or post-trial replays. Should a surprise witness or evidence materialize, the indigent's
defense counsel must face such circumstances alone.
71. Id. at 145.
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the defendant's trial. The New York study, which was done in 1964
as part of the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project, found
that fifty-seven percent of those released on bail were not convicted
while only twenty-seven percent of those detained were not con-
victed.73 Furthermore, the jailed defendants were less likely to re-
ceive a suspended sentence or probation than a bailed defendant.74
The New York study indicated that thirty-six percent of those re-
leased prior to trial did not receive a prison sentence, but it discov-
ered that only nine percent of those detained prior to trial did not
receive a prison sentence.75 This difference may appear to be attrib-
utable to other independent factors such as a prior conviction or
type of counsel received, but this difference remained the same
when these and other independent factors were held constant. For
instance, among those with no prior record fifty-nine percent of the
detained defendants received prison sentences while only ten per-
cent of the bailed defendants received prison sentences.7" Similarly
among those with prior records, eighty-one percent of the jailed
defendants were sentenced to prison, but only thirty-six percent of
the bailed defendants were sentenced to prison.77 The difference was
also not explained by the type of counsel that the defendant re-
ceived. Among those with private attorney, forty-four percent of the
bailed defendants were not convicted; however only eleven percent
of the jailed defendants were not convicted.7" Among those with a
court-appointed attorney, fifty-four percent of the bailed defen-
72. Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641 (1964).
73. Id. at 642.
74. Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 38:
The difference is explained because the accused who is free prior to trial is able to
seek or retain employment, support his family, and demonstrate his reliability by
reappearing in court. Thus he is considered a fit subject for probation or suspended
sentence.
75. Rankin, supra note 72, at 642. Similar results were shown in a study done in Wash-
ington, D.C., by the Junior Bar Section of the District of Columbia Bar Ass'n, The Bail
System of the District of Columbia in D.C. BAIL PROJECT, BAIL REFORM IN THE NATION'S
CAPITAL A-33 (1966).
76. Rankin, supra note 72, at 647.
77. Id. Similar results were shown in conviction rate. Among those with no prior record,
forty-eight percent of the bailed defendants were not convicted, but only twenty-four percent
of the jailed defendants were not convicted. Among those with previous records, twenty-one
percent of the bailed defendants were not convicted, but only fifteen percent of the jailed
defendants were not convicted.
78. Id. at 651.
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dants were not convicted, but only twenty-seven percent of the
jailed defendants were not convicted.79 The study concluded that
detention was the significant factor in the relationship between de-
tention and unfavorable disposition:
This study has demonstrated that each of the five charac-
teristics-prior record, bail amount, type of counsel, family
integration, and employment stability-when considered
separately do not account for the statistical relationship
between detention before adjudication and unfavorable dis-
position. When the characteristics are considered in combi-
nation, they account for only a small part of the relation-
ship. 0
The findings of this study were not unique. Similar results were
disclosed in a study by the New York Legal Aid Society in 1971.1
Those bailed prior to trial were cleared in fifty-one percent of the
cases; those detained prior to trial were cleared in only twenty per-
cent of the cases. s2 Furthermore, those bailed prior to trial were not
sentenced to prison in thirty-two percent of the cases; those de-
tained prior to trial were not sentenced in only eighteen percent of
the cases.8 3 As in the previous Rankin study, this difference could
not be attributed to other independent factors.'" The study held
many other variables-seriousness of the charge, type of crime,
weight of evidence, aggravated circumstances, prior criminal
charge, personal history and amount of bail-constant and found
that these variables would not explain the fact that those detained
prior to trial were more likely to be convicted and to receive harsher
sentences.8 5 Similar results were demonstrated in San Francisco,"8
Sacramento, 7 Boston,8" and Kansas. 9 Thus, considering the verified
79. Id. Similar results were indicated for those convicted but not sentenced to prison.
80. Id. at 649.
81. Pines, supra note 62, at 402.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 403.
85. Id.
86. Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 631, 633 (1964). The study reported convictions for forty-three percent of those released
and seventy-one percent of those detained.
87. Id. Conviction rates were thirty-four percent for those released and eighty-eight
percent for those detained.
88. Note, Preventive Detention, An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. Civ. RILHrs-CIV. Li.
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impact of pretrial detention on the defendant's trial, such pretrial
detention infringes on the defendant's fundamental right to a fair
trial.
Not only does the pretrial detention infringe on the defendant's
right to a fair trial, but pretrial detention also infringes on the
defendant's fundamental right to pretrial freedom. The defendant's
fundamental right to pretrial freedom is based on at least three
interrelated sources: (1) the eighth amendment and the concept of
excessive bail, (2) the presumption of innocence until actual convic-
tion, and (3) the right to privacy and human dignity. First, the
fundamental right to pretrial freedom is implicit in the eighth
amendment's prohibition against excessive bail which is defined as
"a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to assure the
presence of the accused at the trial."90 The whole impetus of the
excessive bail clause is "to insure fair access to pretrial liberty."'"
Second, the fundamental right to pretrial freedom is premised
on the basic presumption of this country "that one charged with a
crime is innocent until after judgment of guilt."92 Imprisonment and
its inherent punishment prior to conviction is contrary to this most
basic concept. Correspondingly this violation of the defendant's pre-
sumption of innocence may infringe on related fundamental rights.
It may intrude on the defendant's right to due process and may even
inflict cruel and unusual punishment:
If the incidents of detention amount to punishment, then
that detention violates the Fifth Amendment, because its
imposition has not been preceded by a procedure comport-
ing with due process. The only procedure which detainees
have gone through is the bail hearing, at which it has been
L. REV. 291, 347 (1971). Fifty-three percent of those released and seventy-four percent of those
detained were convicted. Seventy-four percent of those released and only thirty-one percent
of those detained received probation.
89. Wilson, New Approaches to Pretrial Detention, 39 KAN. BAR Ass'N J. 13 (1970).
Forty-six percent of those released and seventy-two percent of those detained were convicted.
Id. at 15. Fifty-four percent of those released and twenty-six percent of those detained re-
ceived probation. Id. at 39.
90. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). In Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971),
the Supreme Court noted that "the Eighth Amendment's proscription of excessive bail has
been assumed to have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."
91. Foote, supra note 62, at 998-99.
92. Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197 (1960) (Douglas, J., sitting as a circuit judge).
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determined that they could not afford it and were not eligi-
ble for bail. Nothing about guilt has been established. De-
tention under such circumstances is so clearly dispropor-
tionate that it violates not only due process but also the
Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment."
In short, the defendant is deprived of "fundamental fairness by
being punished, imprisoned and presumed guilty before he has been
tried." 4 Furthermore, while any detention is inherently punitive,
"these detainees are subjected to the most severe deprivations and
crudest indignities which exist in the entire penal system."95
Third, the fundamental right to pretrial freedom is related to
the defendant's right to privacy and human dignity. This basic
concept of privacy and human dignity was expressed by Justice
Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure condi-
tions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feeling and
of his intellect. . . . They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions. They conferred as against the government the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.9"
This essential right has been emphasized either explicitly or implic-
itly in a long series of cases.97 The pretrial detainee is stripped of his
ties with family, friends and associations that are intrinsic to the
93. Note, The Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79
YALE L.J. 941, 952 (1970).
94. Meltsner, Pretrial Detention, Bail Pending Appeal, and Jail Time Credit: The
Constitutional Problems and Some Suggested Remedies, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 618, 624 (1967).
95. Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE
L.J. 941 (1970). Pretrial detainees face overcrowded, unsanitary conditions. They often lack
adequate food, clothing, medical attention and recreation. They are subjected to censorship
of their mails and restricted visiting hours.
96. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
97. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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concept of privacy.98 He suffers furthermore from the loss of his
outward privacy by the very nature of imprisonment. But perhaps
the most damaging invasion of the defendant's fundamental right
of privacy and human dignity is his loss of inner privacy. He is
stripped of his own self respect and he is regimented and institution-
alized in his thoughts and acts. The pretrial detainee loses his most
fundamental right-"freedom to be free."99
Because of these serious infringements of the defendant's fun-
damental rights, the court in United States v. Thompson' recog-
nized the need to utilize the strict scrutiny test when faced with an
equal protection challenge of the administration of the bail system.
The petitioner in that case was denied- bail because the District of
Columbia Court Reform Act standards had been employed instead
of the Federal Reform Act standards, although he had been charged
with violation of a federal criminal statute having nationwide appli-
cation. The court held that the petitioner was denied equal protec-
tion since there was no compelling reason to differentiate between
residents of the District of Columbia and residents of the other parts
of the country in setting bail.
The equal protection argument that is raised when the indigent
is denied pretrial freedom solely because he cannot afford the sched-
uled bail must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. It is a
classification based on wealth which should be treated as a suspect
classification. It is furthermore a classification which violates the
indigent's fundamental rights to a fair trial and pretrial freedom.
APPLICATION OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST TO THE EXISTING BAIL
SYSTEM
The strict scrutiny test is more rigid than the rational basis test
in three respects. First, the classification does not carry the heavy
presumption of constitutionality. Second, the classification must be
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.'", Third,
98. Pines, supra note 62, at 396.
99. United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1340 (1971).
100. Id. This case involved the setting of postconviction bail pending appeal. If infring-
ments on fundamental rights are involved in the denial of postconviction freedom pending
appeal then surely infringments on fundamental rights are involved in the denial of pretrial
freedom.
101. See note 33 supra.
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it must be the least drastic means to achieve the governmental
interest.0 2 The classification based on wealth which is created by
the reliance on a scheduled bail system is unconstitutional under
this more rigid standard of review.
The primary purpose of bail is to insure the presence of the
accused at trial.'"3 To achieve this purpose the present bail system
assumes "that the threat of forfeiture of one's goods will be an
effective deterrent to the temptation to break the conditions of one's
release."'0 4 But this theory fails to consider that the indigent defen-
dant may not have any money to forfeit and the wealthier defendant
may not be deterred from fleeing by possible forfeiture. Studies have
indicated that under bail reform projects those released on their own
recognizance were just as likely and in many cases more likely to
appear for trial than those released on money bail. The money bail
requirement, in short, does not bear any relationship to achieving
this state purpose of bail. In New York City, the Manhattan Bail
Project demonstrated that those released on their own recognizance
failed to return in only one percent of the cases. 5 This low nonap-
pearance rate is even more significant when compared with the
willful nonappearance rate for money bail of about five percent.0 "
102. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-13 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
103. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
104. Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197 (1960) (Douglas, J., sitting as circuit judge).
105. Sturz, in Panel Discussion, RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE AND SUMMONS IN LIEU OF
ARREST, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 43 (1964). Under the Manhattan
Bail Project, which is sponsored by the Vera Foundation, the accused is interviewed to check
his previous criminal record and the current charge to determine if he is bailable. Next he is
interviewed about family ties and roots in the community. After this interview, the defendant
is scored according to a point weighing system. If this indicates that he is a good risk for being
released on his own recognizance, the accused is recommended to the judge to be released on
his own recognizance.
106. Ares, Rankin & Sturz, Manhattan Bail Project, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 67, 81 (1963). A
similar rate of nonappearance under money bail was verified by a similar study in New York
City. VERA FOUNDATION OF JUSTICE, STUDY OF PRETRIAL RELEASE 33 (1970):
All Crimes
Bail Amount Jump rate




$500 or under 3.8%
$501-$1000 7.9%
$1001-$2500 11.2%
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Similar bail reform projects throughout the country have produced
comparable results. In San Francisco only one percent of those re-
leased on their own recognizance failed to appear.'07 The St. Louis
bail project reported only 1.3 percent nonappearance rate for those
released on their own recognizance. 08 Under a bail reform project in
Los Angeles, the nonappearance rate was 2.1 percent.00 The Allen
County bail reform program in Indiana reported only a 1.5 percent
willful nonappearance rate."0 Similar low nonappearance rates were
also reported in Des Moines,"' Indianapolis,"2 and Baltimore."3 In
all of these projects the reported nonappearance rate was compara-
ble to or even lower than the nonappearance rate for money bond.
This low nonappearance rate for those released on their own
recognizance has not been limited to these special local foundation
type projects or local governmental programs, but it has also been
verified by broader governmental programs. In 1966 the Federal Bail
Reform Act"4 greatly expanded the use of release on one's recogniz-
ance in the federal courts. The rate of bail jumping in the federal
system by those released on money bail had been three percent
nationwide."' But only two percent of the defendants released on
their personal recognizance failed to appear for trial. "e The Con-
necticut Bail Commission, which operated a state-wide reform pro-
gram financed by the state, reported that only 1.4 percent willfully
failed to appear at trial after being released on their own recogniz-
ance." 7 Thus these experimental projects and existing governmental
Nonappearance rate for those released on their own recognizance was 1.6 percent.
107. Levin, San Francisco Bail Project, 55 A.B.A.J. 135 (1969).
108. O'Reilly and Flanagan, MEN IN DETENTION, REPORT BY CITIZEN'S COMMITrEE FOR
EMPLOYMENT 2 (1967).
109. Kamin, Bail Administration in Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 674, 678 (1965).
110. Letter from James R. Seely, Bail Commissioner, Allen Superior Court, March 8,
1974.
111. National Council on Crime and Delinquency, DES MOINES COMMUNITY CORRECTION
PROJECT: EVALUATION REPORT NUMBER Two 5-6 (1972).
112. COOK COUNTY SPECIAL BAIL PROJECT, PROPOSAL FOR HOLIDAY COURT INTERVIEW
-VERIFICATION PROGRAM 8 (1970).
113. Kennedy, VISTA Volunteers Bring About Successful Bail Reform Project, 54
A.B.A.J. 1093 (1968).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970).
115. R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 283 (1970).
116. Id.
117. O'Rourke and Carter, The Connecticut Bail Commission, 79 YALE L.J. 513, 523-
24 (1970). The Bail Commission however was reduced in manpower and authority in 1969.
This was not due to any real debate on the success of the program, but it was the result of a
budget-cutting and law-and-order climate. Id. at 515.
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programs have confirmed that the requirement of money bond is not
necessary to assure the presence of the defendant at trial."8
Furthermore, even if some relationship could be drawn between
the wealth of the defendant and appearance rate, detention is not
the least drastic means of achieving appearance at the trial. Other
less drastic alternatives are available to insure the defendant's ap-
pearance at the trial: criminal sanction for flight, a policy against
release of defendants who have previously jumped bail, supervision
during the pretrial period by a parole officer, and speedier trials."'
A second possible purpose of the present bail system is to pre-
vent criminal conduct by defendants before trial. However, the
wealth of the defendant and his ability to meet a scheduled bail is
not related to his possible criminal conduct pending trial:
Money bail is just as an inadequate measure against crimi-
nal conduct pending trial as it is against flight. Dangerous
persons with sufficient funds to post bail or pay a bonds-
man go free; in fact a Commission study indicated that
some professional criminals appear to consider the cost of
bail a routine expense of doing business.'
118. Some have criticized these conclusions by arguing that the bail reform projects
only released a limited number of defendants on personal recognizance and that the criteria
used still exclude many of the poor. They therefore claim that these results are unreliable.
This criticism can be answered in several ways. First, the failure of the projects to release
more defendants is attributable to insufficient staffing. Thus, some defendants are not inter-
viewed and many of those interviewed did not have their references verified because of this
lack of staffing. Pines, supra note 62, at 423. Second, studies have indicated that many of
the poor who are held in jail because of their inability to make bond would meet the Manhat-
tan Bail Project standards for release on their own recognizance. Brockett, Presumed Guilty:
The Pretrial Detainee, 1 YALE R. OF LAW AND SocIAL ACTION 10, 15 (1971). Third, the criteria
used for release on personal recognizance could be expanded to include more defendants
without any rise in the rate of nonappearance. O'Rourke and Carter, supra note 117, at 523.
The Chief Bail Commissioner of the Connecticut program indicated that as many as 85-90
percent of the defendants could be released on personal recognizance without any rise in the
rate of nonappearance. Id. Studies, moreover, have indicated that "roots in the community"
is not the most important factor in assuring the appearance of the defendant when he is
released on his own recognizance, but rather the most important factor appears to be the
amount of supervision (i.e., phone calls and letters to remind the defendant of the date of
the trial and active searches for defendants who fail to appear). Pines, supra note 62, at 426.
119. Foote, supra note 66, at 1163. The federal program provides for such alternatives
which minimize the willful nonappearance of the defendant at his trial but at the same time
maximize the defendant's pretrial freedom. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970).
120. Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 40. The Commission in fact noted that "the
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Therefore, if bail is intended to prevent criminal acts by the defen-
dant pending trial, the scheduled bail system is both under and over
inclusive. It is under inclusive because it does not prevent the
pretrial release of "dangerous" defendants who can afford the
scheduled bail. It is over inclusive because it does prevent the
pretrial release of "nondangerous" defendants who cannot afford
the scheduled bail. Thus, since the ability to pay bail is unrelated
to one's propensity to commit criminal acts pending his trial, the
scheduled bail system is not required to prevent possible criminal
acts.
Furthermore, even if there is some relationship between the
wealth of a defendant and his tendency to commit criminal acts
pending trial, detention is not the least drastic means to achieve this
purpose. Less drastic means similar to those used to assure his
presence at trial can be utilized: speedier trials, 2' imposition of
restrictive conditions based on alleged "dangerousness "I22 or denial
of the right to be released in future cases if found responsible for
crimes during the pretrial release period. 2 3
A third possible rationale for the state's reliance on bail sched-
ules is for administrative convenience and economy because it saves
the state from the time and expense of examining each individual
case. This purpose for a scheduled bail system has dubious validity
considering the cost of pretrial detention even with its grossly inade-
quate facilities. New York City, for example, spends over $10 mil-
lion on pretrial detention compared with $14 million for the Crimi-
nal Courts of New York City. 4 Moreover, studies have indicated
that the costs of bail reform projects have been more than paid for
by the savings to the state by reducing the number of pretrial detai-
nees. For instance, during a four year period the San Francisco Bail
Project saved the city at least $1,240,000-ten times more than the
need to raise funds for bond premium may have the unintended effect of leading the defen-
dant to commit criminal acts." Id.
121. Note, Preventive Detention, An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LiB.
L. REV. 291, 359-62 (1971).
122. Id. at 362-65.
123. Id. at 365-68.
124. Criminal Court of the City of New York Annual Report 6 (1971). It should be noted
that skyrocketing costs of pretrial detention centers represent no real improvement in the
conditions of these centers. If the recommendations proposed to mitigate the brutal condi-
tions are put into effect, the annual cost will be many times higher. Pines, supra note 62, at
404 n.55.
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cost of financing the project.'25 The cost of the Manhattan Bail
Project was only about $28.20 per person released, while the average
cost for detention before trial was $186. Thus, retaining the present
system does not appear to be necessarily an administrative cost
savings.
But even if it is less expensive to use a scheduled bail system,
administrative costs and convenience cannot justify classifications
under the strict scrutiny test.2 ' While a state may legitimately at-
tempt to limit expenditures, it "may not accomplish such a purpose
by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens."'28 There-
fore, under the strict scrutiny test the scheduled bail system which
discriminates against the poor cannot be justified. 9 The present
bail system is clearly an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.
CONCLUSION
A § 1983 action in federal court appears to be a viable remedy
for the indigent who faces discrimination under the present money-
based bail system. It does present some procedural difficulties, such
as whether (1) the writ of habeas corpus is the only remedy open to
the indigent, (2) the federal court should abstain because of comity
considerations, and (3) the case will be mooted if the indigent is
tried or released before the federal court hears it. However, by a
precise delineation of the prayer for relief to include (1) a declara-
tory judgment that the present bail system which relies on money
bail or cash bond is unconstitutional, (2) equitable relief requiring
125. Levin, supra note 103, at 135.
126. L. Friedman, The Evolution of Bail Reform 88, December 1972 (working paper on
the Center for the Study of the City and Its Environment, Inst. for Social and Policy Studies,
Yale University).
127. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 266 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). It should be noted that part
of the state's rationale for the discriminatory practice against the poor in the Griffin line of
cases was to reduce the cost of appeals. The Supreme Court rejected this rationale as justify-
ing the discrimination between the poor and wealthy defendants in the appeal proceedings.
128. 394 U.S. at 633.
129. Even under the minimum scrutiny test the present bail system has doubtful valid-
ity. The requirement of a scheduled bail does not appear to bear any rational relationship to
the prevention of flight or criminal acts pending trial or even the saving of administrative
expense. Furthermore, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), suggests that even under the
more lenient test administrative cost and convenience alone cannot justify such discrimina-
tion.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss1/6
1974] BAIL AND THE POOR 191
the institution of a system which does not rely on the use of money
and (3) damages against the county and its officials for collateral
consequences, these difficulties should not bar a § 1983 action. In
such an action the courts should employ the stricter standard of
review, because the reliance on bail schedules invokes a suspect
classification based on wealth. The court should also apply the
stricter standard because pretrial detention infringes on the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial and pretrial freedom. Under this test the
possible state purposes for a scheduled money-based bail system,
(1) insuring the defendant's presence at trial, (2) preventing crimi-
nal conduct by the defendant pending his trial, and (3) saving the
state administrative costs, fail to justify its discrimination against
the poor. Thus, a § 1983 action appears to present the indigent with
an effective remedy for his discriminatory treatment under the pres-
ent money-based bail system.
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